

### Method of the perpetrator – modus operandi:

A male person – pretending to be a representative of the Belgian Approval Agency - contacted the Chemical Distributor XY in Belgium and asked for the transmission of diverse documents with regard to drug precursors trade – allegedly in the framework of a regulatory inspection. To this end, a „fake“ e-mail address was communicated which resembles the e-mail address of the Belgian Approval Agency.

The Belgian Chemical Distributor XY transmitted diverse documents. Additionally, it disclosed – on request – the contact details of the German mother company XY in North Rhine Westphalia. Shortly afterwards, the Company XY was contacted again being asked for the official registration of Company XY for **Acetic Anhydride**. This chemical substance, however, is not sold by the concerned Belgian company.

Two weeks later, the alleged representative of the Belgian Approval Agency contacted the German Company in North Rhine Westphalia (mother company) and asked in the context of the inspection of the Belgian affiliated company XY for the transmission of the official (German) Registration for **Acetic Anhydride** as well as an end-use declaration for potassium permanganate, which was sent to the alleged representative of the Belgian Approval Agency.

Shortly thereafter, at the alleged behest of the Belgian and German Chemical Distributor XY respectively, orders for Acetic Anhydride in Belgium (3000 litres) and in Germany (2000 litres) were placed. In both cases faked documents and the „original“ registration of the companies XY respectively were used. Due to the alertness of the inquired companies a diversion of Acetic Anhydride could be prevented. *(Another case in Poland is still under investigation.)*

**The perpetrators obtained - under a pretexte - in a targeted manner the official registration for Acetic Anhydride of a chemical company in order to be able to use it for illegal diversions of Acetic Anhydride at other chemical distributors. Proceeding in this way, the impression was given that the orders were placed on behalf of the reputable chemical company. More ordering attempts using this registration can be expected.**

**Moreover, it cannot be excluded that also other (German) companies will be targeted by these „fake“ inquiries.**

*In this context, the Joint Grundstoffüberwachungsstelle ZKA/BKA at the Bundeskriminalamt Wiesbaden (GÜS), points to the fact that inquiries from foreign authorities towards German economic operators are unusual. Foreign Approval Agencies would – if necessary – contact the competent German authority. Registrations are available at National Authorities themselves – as issuing authority, registrations do not have to be requested at companies.*

*In case of doubt, please contact the German Federal Institute for Drugs and Medical Devices (BfArM) or the respective national authorities in other countries.*